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Change the Past: 
Factum Infectum Fieri Nequit and Eternal Return
The purpose of this article is to show how a classic topic as the possibility to change the past,
which is part of the contemporary debate as well, can be faced and rethought by some of
Emanuele Severino’s theoretical reflections. Thanks to this approach, it has been possible to
understand the underlying reasons for the ambitious to change the past and why a goal like
this one seems so hard to hit. Moreover, there will be the opportunity to figure out which is
the best philosophical proposal, within the history of philosophy, in terms of coherence to
achieve it. The outcome of this work is going to illustrate how the ambition to change the
past is impossible as built on a nihilistic assumption. 
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Second Part - THEORETICAL STUDIES 
1. Introduction: being able to change the past
Being able to change the past is probably one of the most common
desire, dream or fantasy for the humankind. It is easy to understand
looking at the literature fields, both contemporary and science fiction, or
the philosophical debate as well. Commonly, there is the attitude to
think about the possible past alteration as something on the edge
between reality and imagination. The reason for it lies in the fact that the
content of what we would change is unchangeable, unmodifiable namely
something already passed. There are not many examples of what we
could call “unchangeable” since it is not easy to think about something
which has a specific structure such as to not change or become. Probably,
the reason for this difficulty is attributable to the lack of things with these
characteristics. Moreover, if we retrieve the concepts of the philosophical
debate within the last century, these examples become less and less more.
One unchangeable example is fundable and it is still very healthy even
though the contemporary philosophical reflection has destroyed the
majority of these elements.This unchangeable is right the past. An event,
a thing, and in general anything flew away is considered really
unchangeable by all, intellectuals or not. Something already happened or
realised is done and is not longer part of the present. That is why it is
considered a past and as such, there is not any power, directed by a
willingness or not, able to change it, and for that reason, we call it
“unchangeable” or “immutable”. This past unchangeability can be
summarised by this traditional expression: factum infectum fieri nequit.
From the ancient time the past unavailability to any kind of change was
quite clear. Indeed, Aristotle illustrated it clearly in his Nicomachean
Ethics: 
Choice is not concerned with what has happened already: for
example, no one chooses to have sacked Troy; for neither does one
deliberate about what has happened in the past, but about what
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still lies in the future and may happen or not; what has happened
cannot be made not to have happened. Hence Agathon is right in
saying: «This only is denied even to God, The power to make
what has been done undone» (VI, 1139b).
However, although the past is being described with this untouchable
halo, there are relevant number of attempts throughout the history to
reconsider its structure and unchangeability from both the scientific and
philosophical perspectives in the contemporaneity. After all, the desire to
change the past will never be setting and it is expecting that these
attempts, even just in theory, would be made. If we look at the theoretical
tradition, for instance, there are lots of cases. One example is present on
the medieval age when were discussed the problem of the godlike
omnipotence limits (Boulnois, 1994). Alternatively, more recently, the
neoidealistic concept of the past as a creation from the spirit, or the
hermeneutic principle by with any historical reconstruction is only
hypothetical; we can also think about some interpretations of the
relativity theory in the modern physic (Davies, 1995) and there are also
plenty of hypothesis around the possibility of time travels (Torrengo,
2011). We are going to refer to the reflections on the past and its
structure considering a great contemporary philosopher, Emanuele
Severino, in order to try to investigate the human desire we explained
before. Severino’s account, in our opinion, will be revelatory to
understand the real reasons underlying this problem, its core role within
the contemporary debate and the possibility to evaluate correctly the
conclusions achieved so far.
2. The unchangeables' fallen
On Severino’s works, we will find the explanation of what is called the
true essence of the philosophy in our era, namely the willingness to deny
any possible unchangeable trying to stop the becoming. The becoming
is considered the supreme evidence and it is structured as the movement
between being and nothingness. This passage has always been assumed as
absolutely true and clear by those Severino had called nihilists fully
believers in this supreme evidence. This has assumed always more
coherence until today where it is the Western’s soul and of the entire
world as well. As long as true that the becoming faith has never been
questioned from nihilists or mortals, calling humans by Severino, only
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due to the time carry out this supreme evidence has got more awareness
and intensity. On one side, anyone would ever be so crazy to state that
being can become nothingness and vice-versa. On the other side,
Western’s unconscious works exactly in this way thinking that “being is
nothingness and nothingness is being” is the supreme evidence and this
is what happens in the becoming process. Each mortal tried to create
restrictions to the becoming because none has been able to see its real
essence. Staying on the surface, humans believed to change the becoming
in a non-nihilistic perspective, giving it a different structure with
limitations being the unchangeable as a guarantee of its non-
contradictory. All these endeavours had failed since they did not
understand the becoming’s deep meaning. These restrictions fell under
the power of the becoming. Indeed, if the becoming is meant as the only
and supreme evidence, regardless of understating its nihilistic effect,
anything which tries to stop it will be overwhelmed because any
limitations cannot exist anymore since they have not let the becoming
being what it really is. The unchangeables appeared during the Western’s
history are examples of restrictions such as God, eternal truths, scientific
knowledge, past immutability, and so on. All are destined to be fought
and probably beaten as a limitation of the being process in its nihilistic
conception, so Severino (1999) writes:
According to the essential voice of the contemporary philosophy,
the “truth” which cannot exist is the one is demanding to stay over
the becoming of the world; given that the becoming existence is 
the only unchangeable truth, and this is the ground of the
invincible demonstration by means the contemporary approach
zforces to deny each unchangeable, namely every God and every
immutable past (p. 23).
Clearly, it is impossible to believe that the being can nullify itself and
vice versa, but this is the way followed by mortals, the nihilistic way,
which is the one they believed to undertake. According to the false
evidence of becoming, the powerness that comes from it is focused on
destroying each eternal and unchangeable item. This will, in fact, is
nothing else than the faith to the possibility that things can nullify
themselves. Even if it is not one of the purposes of this article to retrieve
all the Severino’s think aspects, it is necessary to clarify why God and the
past as unchangeables represent an obstacle for the becoming and why
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earlier or later they must be challenged and possibly overwhelmed.
Severino (2011) on this subject says:
[…] Western’s God (and also any other God is assuming the same
ontological-teological pattern) is the entification of what is still
nothingness which is specific of the future, and of what is almost
nothingness that is particular of the past (brings forward the being
of what, on the contrary, is still a nothingness and keeps the being
of what is almost nothingness). God makes entity the nothingness
because he is the Law that mastering the time totality fills each gap
presents into the nothingness which is specific of the future and
the past. Thus, it makes impossible those becoming that is the
supreme evidence undeniable and incontrovertible both for the
Western tradition and its destruction (p.162).
God is the One who has the full and sure knowledge about everything
that was, is and will be, regardless of the fact that at this moment what
He knows does not exist in the act. What becomes cannot come
completely from the nothingness whereas, if known by God, it cannot be
nothing. In fact, it is impossible to know something that is nothing
because either it is something, but in this case, it is not coming from the
nothingness, or it is nothing, whereby it cannot be known as long as
knowing something which is nothing is the same of knowing nothing.
The godlike knowledge already knows in advance what it will create
through the ideas, but the real products are ex nihilo. The becoming in
its fullness cannot accept an eternal knowledge which can forecast it in
some way. The becoming process must be always unpredictable to be
coherent since no one can forecast what will come out from the
nothingness, for the reason that it is something that comes from the
nothingness where there are no things. God creates the world from its
being nothing (ex nihilo sui), as he creates the other from himself, insofar
he cannot have a glance inside this nothingness, as long as it does not
contain anything. For this reason, God too is threatened from the
unpredictability that comes from the nothingness, and Severino (2011)
insists:
In fact, inside God productor all the entities are contended in
advance (either though he is the demiurge who sees the totality of
“ideas” having them inside himself since he is seeing them or if he
is the creator that has them inside in any sense). For this side, they
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are produced ex Deo. However, there is a second side. If they were
nothing, the totality of what God produces would already be in
God, insofar he will have no need to produce them. Then, they
would not be something produced as well. For this reason – as
long as what is not produced (yet) are, in God, a nothingness –
they are, as such, produced ex nihilo: God can produce them
because, in him, they are nothing. Now, since the entities
produced are ex Deo, God cannot be afraid of his own creation’s
action: he knows and dominates it completely. Nonetheless, as
long as the produced entities are ex nihilo (they are created from
their being nothing since they are still only in God), what will be
producing from this nothingness, which is in God, is totally
unpredictable not only by the mortals but also to God’s
omniscience. If the nothingness of what will be a creature –
insofar that is in God and that it is necessary which was being
known by God – is not apparent, the nothingness is not a
dimension penetrable going in it would be possible to see in
advance what will come out from it. Hence, it is God's
omnipotence itself which is threatened by this unpredictability.
Due to this unpredictability, God cannot be the Omniscient and
Omnipotent (pp. 226-227).
God’s omnipotence and omniscience cannot compete with the
becoming nihilistic coherence which calls into question not only the
powers of Western and Christian God (and to all the religions as well)
but also the past unchangeability as a limit that must be overcome.
Going back to the topic stated at the beginning, the past necessity is a
limitation for the becoming as long as there is always something, namely
the past, which forecast the coming from nothingness, remaining
untouched from the changing. The past, being a dimension not
subjected to the changing as it is not present anymore, represents an
unchangeable which is always stopping the complete coming from
nothing of the being and in some ways, it gathers all the being already
become nothing through the flow of time. Implicitly, mortals give the
reason for this past double structure. On one hand, they believe
everything passing away will get the nothingness. On the other hand,
humans state what has been of what it is now nothing cannot disappear,
but it will last forever. The past becomes what before that in some way it
is present in each later and it is influencing the origin which would be
unpredictable. To overcome the insurmountable limit represented by the
past, there is only one way: transforming itself in something which can
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be changed as the content of the will of power. Since one of the most
important characteristics distinguishing the past from the present is the
impossibility to change the past depending on the will of power or the
becoming, it will be necessarily able to get the hands on it as well. It is
mandatory to destroy the impossibility of past changeableness. For this
reason Severino (1980) claims:
The Western, indeed, is also the overcoming of past elusiveness
and unreachability; it is the will to realise this overcoming. Wi -
thin this over falling in the difference between the past and the
present, namely also the past becomes a present. In the nihilistic
glance, in fact, the past is what has become unchangeable – an
unchangeable that results more resistant than the others Western
unchangeables –but, due to this, is unavoidable that it shows itself
like what the nihilistic coherence aims to destroy, based on the
becoming evidence. As well as unavoidable the destruction of an
unchangeable goal, under which the becoming is forced to follow
and from which it is then made impossible as authentic becoming
(namely as something that comes out from nothing). Hence it is
unavoidable the destruction of past unchangeability – the
destruction of its impossibility to be different anymore from 
how it is, – to which the becoming and the history must always
relate and adequate to. It is not simply matter of being free from
the existent order, which is called «liberation from the past»
because that order has existed since long ago: it is a more radical
liberation, namely the liberation from the being-been of what had
been, of what had been but it is not anymore: the liberation from
the fact that a certain order had been and, being-been, is by now
a necessity that had been in that way (p. 202).
It essentially matters of destroying those we summarised briefly with
factum infectum fieri nequit. This represents what is still under the idea
that it existed what had existed. However, even if what has become past
is no longer existing, this does not mean that its being-been is nullified.
The factum infectum fieri nequit is nothing but the eternal being-been of
those order that will be forever. According to Severino, this is the way to
intend all the attempts appeared during the contemporary age to
overcome past's unchangeability. They try to make the past available to
be manipulated as well as the other unchangeables to transform the
factum infectum fieri nequit into a factum infectum fieri quit. Severino
(1980) writes:
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To nihilism's eyes, the past seems, on one side, as what is become
nothing, and, on the other side, as what is existed following a
certain order: this order is becoming nothing. However, the
being-been of the order has not become nothingness yet. In the
Western’s history, this being-been of the order seems to be, at first,
as an absolute immutability, the factum infectum fieri nequit
immutability. The nihilism coherence, since pushes to destroy all
the unchangeables (among which we find also the determinism
embedded into Einstein’s relativity theory) projects the
destruction of the past immutability, by means of projecting a
situation where the factum infectum fieri quit (pp. 202-203).
3. The factum infectum fieri nequit irremovability
Among these chances to change the past, it is possible to find one which
is, according to Severino, the most coherent and effective: Nietzsche’s
eternal return. Severino gives an interpretation of Nietzsche’ account,
which is really controversial, but it is considered as the extreme effort to
destroy one of the most resistant unchangeables, namely the past. The
past is what already happened and escapes from the will to power. Thus,
the will must find a way to take it over. This way cannot be the same one
which simply considers the past as a present; so, it does not matter of
change the past in the same way it is possible to modify the present time.
I have the power the changing now how the objects in front of me are
disposed of, but I cannot change their past pattern. For this reason, many
theories about potential ways to think and make the past changeable
have been completely unmakeable. The will must want the past as it has
always been wanted, so it must want reversely everything wanted.
Severino (1999) gives the following illustration on this topic:
A processing will of the past keeps going to have in front of it what
she transforms and from what tries to stay away leaving it in its
being definitely been what had been, as something not wanted in
front of the will. The will is not powerless in relation to the past
only if she continues – and eternally – to will it in the same way
she wanted it; and only her, in the infinite past, has continued
eternally to will it. The will capability to will backward everything
she had wanted cannot be also the will to make not happened
what happened, so it cannot be the will to replace the factum
infectum fieri nequit with factum infectum fieri potest. This
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replacing would bring it to the nullification of the past, and as
such to the nullification of the becoming, namely the nullification
of what is, contrarily, the supreme evidence. The past nullification
has nothing to deal with the will capability to will backward the
past because the nullification of the past is the nullification of this
capability simultaneously. A will ables to make not happened
what happened is not a powerful will, or particularly capable to
change the past, but it is a will that nullifies herself, nullifying the
becoming her lets flow and pass (p. 249).
It does not matter of retrieving the past to satisfy a hedonistic
pleasure. The real power is to will it eternally and exactly how it has been
wanted. The act of recreating the past, when completed, becomes
something past as well, growing the being-been dimension. That is why
neither the godlike omnipotence nor Gentile’s idealism, as Severino
highlighted, can have a real effect on the possibility to destroy the past
unchangeability (Severino, 1999). The will would fight a losing battle
which would not do anything else than confirming and extending the
being-been dimension at the expense of the power of will and of
becoming that will be more restricted. The possibility to change the
being-been is then the problem core and it is also very clear from both
the medieval question around the godlike omnipotence and Nietzsche’s
eternal return account. Again, why is the past unchangeability a so strong
enemy to overwhelm? In some way, we have already explained the
reasons behind its power. However, now we are going to illustrate it
clearer, showing the factum infectum fieri nequit’s real effect. According to
Severino, we can start from a simple example in order to highlight the
truthiness of this account. Let us assume that we want to move an object,
such as a lamp, from its position to another one on its left. To represent
it, we can indicate it as mlL (m = movement, l = left, L = lamp). What
does it mean to change the past in relation to our example, then? To
answer, we should find out if it is possible or not to move L, which is the
lamp before its move to the left, in another way from how we did it.
Changing the past means, following the example, to be able to make a
different movement of L and not of mlL, as long as mlL is the present
and L is the past after the movement is done. To think a different L’s
movement, for instance to the right, means to think a mrL or, which is
the same, a non-mlL. However, if it is possible to move differently L,
there would be a contradictory situation where L has been moved
simultaneously to one direction and to the other: there would be an
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impossible coexistence of both mlL and non-mlL. The lamp would and
would not have been moved to the left at the same time, let us assume to
the right in order to have mlL = mrL, which infringes the non-
contradiction principle. At this point, there are other attempts to try to
avoid the contradiction, but also these, as we will see, will be wrong.
Indeed, if we say that there are any contradictions to state both mlL and
non-mlL as long as they are not happening on the same time, but, let us
assume, one before and one after, we are not doing anything else than
denying to non-mlL the status of alternative past from mlL. The reason
for it is that if non-mlL would be a movement which occurs after mlL’s
one, neither L being-been nor mlL unchangeability will be denied.
Simply, the lamp would have been moved before to the left and then to
the right, but the being-been of these movements, will not be modified.
Another option could be to state that to the movement to non-mlL of L
corresponds mlL’s nullifying in order to avoid the contradiction where
both are together: mlL and non-mlL. L would be moved to non-mlL and
simultaneously mlL would be nullified, and the past would be modified
then. The problem here is related to mlL’s nullification because, during
its implementation, non-mlL leaves untouched mlL’s being-been. As
such, there is again a contradictory situation with a time coexistence of
both mlL and non-mlL. In fact, non-mlL’s being which should be the
same as mlL’s not being would stay together with mlL’s being-been. There
would be again a situation where before would happen mlL and then
non-mlL, but this, as we illustrated, is not enough to state the past
changeability. The last chances available seem to be those which believe
not only mlL is nullified by the arrival of non-mlL, but also mlL being-
been is nullified due to non-mlL coming. Alternatively, there is the
option which thinks that mlL is never existed when non-mlL occurs.
Both are impossible as well and indeed Severino (2011) states:
To will the transformation of the past L in non-mlL would
necessary, insofar, not only the nullification of mlL, but the
nullification of mlL's being-been as well, namely it would be
necessary the impossible. Being the impossible the fact that mlL's
being-been becomes the not being-been of mlL and therefore the
being-been of mlL would not be the being-been of mlL. (Since
the factum infectum fieri nequit is thought outside the destiny
structure, it is, as the others traditional logical-ontological
principles, the faith that the entity is not other from itself ).
Finally, it is impossible that, due to the will to transform the past
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of L in non-mlL, it must believe that mlL had never been. Indeed,
if mlL appeared on the isolated earth (if it is truthiness of the
destiny that it appeared on the dream of isolated earth) is a
contradiction to believe that it had never been; if, instead, mlL has
never appeared, the will to transform L in non-mlL is not then a
will the past (L) because L is a proper past since before that in
non-mlL had transformed in a certain way – for instance in mlL,
which is a being-been compared to non-mlL (pp. 286-287).
This illustrates how it is impossible to will the past, as to think of
changing it. It is just possible to deceive of being able to change it. The
demonstration stated before shows how the past and presence difference
is necessary and how it is impossible for the will to transform the past as
she believes to change the present. According to Severino, the factum
infectum fieri nequit is part of logical-ontological traditional principles
even if within a nihilistic faith to the becoming-other of things. It ensures
the past unchangeability based on the non-contradiction law. Nietzsche’s
eternal return, on the other hand, is not directly against the law as long
as it does not aim to make nothingness what was, whereby, with a
different account, it tries to make what has been as wanted in the exact
way it has been, forever. 
4. The eternal return unstoppability
To outline a little bit more how Severino’s account describes the eternal
return capability to rise as the effective action of taking control on the
past by the will, it is important to explain how the past seems to the
majority of the people. The past is always considered as something which
nullifies both itself and its content on one side and, on the other side, as
ongoing in its image. When an event becomes the past its content
nullifies itself, but the remembering of it stays as existent on the memory.
The remembering is not the past, but only a faded picture of it, which is
something and not nothingness since it is remembered. The memory is
then the continuing into being of the passed picture, even if the past is
so far nullified. That is why normally it looks impossible to think that the
will is able to get the hands on the past as long as it is already nothing.
The ambitious of eternal return, the superman’s will of power, as
described by Nietzsche, must be outlined as the capability to will
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eternally the real existence of the past content in order to take it out from
the nothingness where it is gone. The will achieves its top level on the
eternal return and it must throw out the past from the nothingness it
stays as past to have it in its real form. In this perspective, Nietzsche does
not differ from the common view of the past as the process where the
content is nullified and the image of its continued existence. Moreover,
if we want to understand what is the result of going into the nothingness
by the being, we will discover that it is nothing else than the being-been
of being. Any being as long as it is passed becomes a being which being-
been. The being-been is the past of the present being and that is why
Nietzsche is in line with the Western’s thought. Normally, the will
believes to have power only on the present, so on the being not on the
past which is the being-been. Nevertheless, it is exactly what the will tries
to do in order to change the past. The real power on the past is not to
make it different from what it is or to create it again in a different
manner. The real power is to want it again exactly how it has been
eternally to make it eternally wanted. In this instance, then, Nietzsche’s
eternal return must be read: to transform “what was” into “what I wanted
that was”. As Severino (1999) says:
The power on the entity totality by the will that wants the eternal
return is superior also than the God’s omnipotence because also
this one […] cannot do anything on a past that appears as already
solidified in its being-been what it had been – God’s omnipotence
cannot has no power if we expect those absurd form of power
which wants to make infectum the factum (and, as we already said,
it is surely not this absurd that the extreme power of the eternal
return will believes to realise), but in the sense that God’s
omnipotence, once something has been produced and made a
factum by it, the omnipotence has no more power on it. The
supreme power on the factum does not consist on modifying,
creating or recreating it, but on willing it in the same way it has
been wanted, namely in the infinite return of the will that wanted
it, and therefore in the infinite return of all the things which had
been wanted, and they are the totality of the things. Only if the
wanted is wanted in this manner, it does not establish as an eternal
which makes powerless the will and impossible the becoming. It
is, indeed, this supreme form of power to be necessary required by
the becoming evidence (pp. 394-395).
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The highest form of power belongs to the eternal return. The will
which wants the eternal return of all the things is not following the logic
says that to have power on the past you must be able to change it. The
becoming has no longer an unchangeable eternal which determines it in
advance having a nullifying effect. It has an eternal wanted beforehand,
that being wanted, it is not escaping from the will and, apparently, from
the becoming. In Nietzsche’s eternal return there is not an immediate
contrast between his perspective and the factum infectum fieri nequit
since the latter seems too strong to be overwhelmed to the former. Thus,
Nietzsche’s account gets around this obstacle trying to want eternally the
past without changing it. This is the only way to attempt a power
extension of the will on the past. Generally, the will is a little bit
ambiguous in relation to the past because she must want eternally each
content she wants, but she must also not want anymore what she wants
in order to want also all the others wanted which build the will
becoming. Only the eternal return seems to overcome the contradiction
insofar if the will wants eternally again everything she wanted, this will
without differences allows that herself, in the future, do not leave what
was being-been in the way it had been, but she will want it again
eternally. Future and past will be eternally wanted anyway, even if the will
can, at some point, stop to want what she wants. There will never be a
future eternally future or a past eternally past which can escape from the
will making the becoming impossible. According to the becoming
coherence, only the eternal return can set itself as unchangeable as long
as the past does not rise as an insurmountable limit.  
5. Over the eternal return and the factum infectum fieri nequit
Nietzsche’s proposal, read by Severino, is so very interesting because he
makes the past depending on the will which wants it eternally and, in this
way, she makes it changeable under a certain perspective, reaching the
goal where lots of other proposals failed. However, it is necessary to
highlight how behind this perspective, there are still several issues. The
eternal return will believe to have power on the past insofar she wants it
exactly how it is, but in this way, she is confirming again its unchangeable
structure. Both the will which beliefs to be able to act on the things and
the becoming will find their selves crushed again under the weight of the
same doctrine they used to obtain the strongest power. The eternal return
of all the things is itself an eternal as such it includes a limitation for the
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becoming, indeed, as eternal never become other. The becoming
achieved the maximum power through the eternal return, but from this
eternal has been cancelled. The eternal return, in fact, anticipates and
establishes in advance the future, damaging the news that can appear
thanks to the becoming because everything that will happen, there would
be happened already always. The past unchangeability is not only
untouched from the eternal return, but it is also influencing the future
itself. The will would be free within its will, but the actions she does are
eternally the same ones, and they will appear again infinite times. The
will which wants to be free from the past unchangeability ends to be a
slave of its willing always the same things. Moreover, the major issue,
Severino highlighted, is that the eternal return is not an ordinary result
which depends on a specific point of view, whereas it is the necessary
outcome which comes from the radical attempt to make the becoming
totally consistent with itself. For this reason, the difficulties encountered
during the explanation mentioned before are not due to the eternal
return, but because of the contradictory of the becoming itself. The true
problem lies in the becoming and only in a second time on the instance
which can try to express best its essence, for this reason Severino (1999)
writes:
The becoming process implies necessarily the non-becoming,
namely the denial of itself. That means the becoming is a
contradictory concept in itself. Assuming the eternal – being it
eternity – is a concept implies the denial of those difference
between being and nothingness that establishes the original
structure of Western's thinking and in its fulfilled meaning
requires that something is not its other. The eternal return of
everything anticipates and establishes in advance the totality of the
future. It defeats the becoming in a more radical way than God's
eternity, because the fact that God exists is the fundamental
illusion of the metaphysical thinking; but that the eternal return
exists is an imperative necessity, required by the same essence of the
becoming (p. 414).
If the problem, following Severino, is present on the becoming itself,
which consequences should we draw on the way of thinking the past and
the possibility that it could be changed? The identification between
being and nothingness is the contradiction inherent to the becoming as
long as it is usually considered by the mortals. Thus, our way of thinking
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the past should firstly make it free from this contradictory status. We saw
how commonly when an event becomes past, it is linked to its
nullification and how of this being-been will remain only its remember.
However, now, according to what we said so far, the question is: under
which fundament we can claim that what seems past for our memory is
only a picture of something that is nothing now? If the past became
nothing, we cannot say that an image of it appears. Indeed, a
remembrance of something which is nothing could not appear. The
remembrance is something, but if we say that it remembers a
nothingness, we are saying nothing else that it is not remembering
(which means that you are remembering the nothingness, obviously).
Furthermore, we would state that the remembrance is not remembering
anything. To remember nothing is the same of not remembering. Clearly,
if the past would really be a process where the things are going into the
nothingness, remembers and memory would not have any content. It is
impossible to remember what is nothing because there would be nothing
to remember. Refusing these conclusions, we could answer to these
considerations stating that it is not correct to say: the remembrance is a
remembering of nothingness, but it is a remembering of the being-been
of something which is now a nothingness. The remembrance is not
dealing with the current and proper being of an event, but with its being-
been and since the being-been is not a nothingness, it is impossible to
state that the remembrance is based on the nothingness. Actually, it is
exactly on this point that Severino stresses, claiming that this approach
identifies the entity nullification which becomes past with its positive
being-been, and, moreover, it is impossible to see the contradiction
embedded on saying that something, whatever it is, from being becomes
nothing during the passage from the present to the past. The being
cannot identify itself with the nothingness; thus, if something is, exists,
it cannot become nothing. If we would still believe it, we should explain
how it is possible that something which becomes nothing keeps its being-
been, or its not being nothing. The being-been of something, now in the
present moment, matches with its being nothing, insofar if it would not
be nothing, it will be still present and not something past. It would be so
and not a being-been (or something no more present). Severino (2011)
gives the following illustration of his position:
It is impossible that what had been would be, when and because
it had been – namely when and because is nothing, – an entity;
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thus, like it is impossible that a squared circle would be a circle. It
ispossible to believe that it is, only if we divide its being circle of
its being square; so it is of the circle, divided in this way, that is
not contradictory saying that is circle […] However, claiming
this, we are not referring to a consistent unit in the entity which
would be the squared-circle, but we are referring to a circle and to
a square, and if now we identify those unity with this duality, it is
possible to deceive to be able to claim without contradiction that
a squared circle is a circle. Similarly, it is impossible to state that
what had been had been (when and because it had been) an entity.
In fact, what had been is an entity-that-had-been (when and
because it had been) an entity because what had been an entity-
that-is-nothing. Therefore, as long as it is an entity which had
become nothing, it is an entity which is nothing. But it is
impossible that an entity-that-is-nothing would be an entity
(when and because it had been), only if we divide its being entity
from its being nothing, and it is claimed of its being entity that is
an entity. Not even there, insofar, we are referring to the entity-
that-is-nothing unity, but we are referring to the entity and the
nothing; and if, at this point, we identify those unity with this
duality, it is possible to deceive to be able to claim without
contradiction that the entity-that-is-nothing, namely the entity-
that-had-been, is an entity. Therefore, it is impossible that the
remembrance remembers what had been and it is now nothing
(pp. 527-528).
Only an existent can appear in the remembrance, something being
and it is not nothing. However, the scenario where something can
become a nothingness is the impossible which is never realising. Thus,
the past cannot match with the nullifying of entities, so the being-been
cannot have any existence if it matches with the nullifying of something.
For the same reason, changing the past is something impossible. Indeed,
if changing the past brings about the fact that something which had
been, was not being or, in other words, that something which cannot not
be a nothingness nullifies itself. That is why the possibility to change the
past is impossible since it matches with the idea to make nothing the
being. Changing the past, essentially, is impossible in so far as it is the
same of making nothingness something that is (Severino (1995) wrote a
lot on the contradiction of becoming nothingness and also on the
becoming something different from itself ). Being and nothingness
cannot be identified and on this crucial concept of Severino’s account,
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our claims must be reorganised. That something that had been, cannot
not being-been it is true only if being and nothing are not identified. The
factum infectum fieri nequit, insofar, should be understood correctly
through a logic where the past does not match with the nullifying
process. Severino illustrates how the being-been if implying the
nothingness of the being, has no reason to exist as a concept. Further, it
would be correct not to say: “that what was being cannot not being-
been”, but “that what it is, cannot not being”. What it is, staying always
on the being, cannot becoming nothingness, it will always be what it is,
eternally. The factum infectum fieri nequit not seems to find a secure place
into Severino’s approach. On the contrary, it would stay embedded in a
nihilistic's logic where the being goes to the nothingness and vice versa.
Precisely, in our opinion, the factum infectum fieri nequit would not be
denied but rethought better. It shows the impossibility of becoming
other in and of the past thanks to its foundation on the non-
contradiction principle. Thus, if it would be reinterpreted in a non-
nihilistic perspective, we will find it expressed in different ways. For
instance, the “what was being cannot not being-been” can be replaced by
“what had appeared, cannot not being appeared”. The non-nihilistic
becoming, stated by Severino, as appearing and disappearing of entities,
would do a step back to leave another figure of the factum infectum fieri
nequit which is non-nihilistic as well. What had appeared cannot not be
appeared: “quod apparuit nequit non apparuisse”. The eternal return
should be correctly understood as the eternal staying into the being of
everything that exists, appears or not appears. It cannot exist as
continuous and cyclical in and out from the being to the nothingness and
vice versa. What it remains eternally into the being. On the eternity of
entities and the consequences of it, we must send back to Severino’s
works, since here it is important to conclude highlighting how the topic
around the possibility to change the past can be placed in a specific
philosophical context as emblematic demonstration of the essence
presents on the ground of the contemporary debate. The radicalisation
of the becoming nihilistic conception forces to think about the fallen of
each unchangeable and the past as one of those. What stated so far,
thanks to Severino’s account, shows also the impossibility of a project
where the becoming would be intended in a nihilistic way as the
ambitious to be able to change the past.
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